In People v. R., the First Department concluded that the trial court had not secured a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel, rendering the resulting convictions unsound. Rivera had been convicted after a nonjury trial of two counts of second‑degree burglary and one count of third‑degree robbery, and he was later resentenced. On appeal, however, the panel determined that the foundational constitutional error required reversal.
The record demonstrated that R. had a lengthy criminal history, dating back to the early 1990s, and that he openly acknowledged both past and current substance‑use issues. Those circumstances constituted clear “red flags” that should have prompted the trial court to conduct a more searching inquiry into his mental capacity and his ability to comprehend the proceedings. Instead, the court conducted only a minimal colloquy, one that failed to explore Rivera’s age, education, familiarity with the criminal justice system, or any other factors relevant to an intelligent and voluntary waiver.
The insufficiency of the inquiry was compounded by the fact that the presiding judge had been assigned to the case only a month before trial and therefore lacked the extended, firsthand exposure to the defendant that sometimes mitigates a sparse colloquy. The court also failed to provide the detailed warnings required before permitting a defendant to proceed pro se. R. was not advised of the potential aggregate sentence he faced, nor was he meaningfully informed of the practical dangers inherent in self‑representation — including the complexities of cross‑examination, the demands of opening statements and summations, and the challenges posed by legal terminology and procedural rules.
Although R. accurately recited the charges, he also expressed confusion about the possibility of being convicted of additional offenses, further underscoring the inadequacy of the court’s warnings and the absence of a knowing waiver. The brief, generalized cautions the court did offer — such as noting that Rivera was not trained as a lawyer — did not satisfy the requirement for a “searching inquiry.”
Given these deficiencies, the appellate court held that R.’s waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Because he represented himself during critical stages, including the waiver of a jury trial and pretrial hearings, the error required reversal. The matter was remanded for new hearings and a new trial, and the panel declined to reach R.’s remaining arguments.
In the end, the only thing R. waived successfully was the original judgment.
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DECISION