1250 Broadway, 27th Floor New York, NY 10001

COUNCIL MEMBER WAS PERMITTED TO DEFAME?

In the case of O. v D., the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed defamation claims brought by attorney M.O. against E.L., a council member for the Town of Yorktown.

The dispute stemmed from a 2018 grievance complaint filed by E.L. and others, alleging that M.O. had a conflict of interest by representing both a taxpayer and the Town in related legal matters. The Attorney Grievance Committee ultimately issued an admonition to M.O.

Following that outcome, E.L. released a media advisory and spoke at a press conference, stating that M.O. had been “reprimanded” and had engaged in “illicit quid pro quo.” In response, M.O. initiated a lawsuit asserting slander per se and libel per se, arguing that these statements were defamatory and damaging to his professional reputation.

The Westchester County Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of E.L., dismissing the defamation claims. On appeal, the AD2 affirmed the dismissal, though on different grounds. The court held that even assuming the statements were defamatory, E.L. was protected by absolute privilege because he made them in his official capacity as a council member. This privilege shields individuals participating in official government functions from defamation liability for statements made in that context.

M.O. failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome this defense, and the court found no triable issue of fact. The decision reinforces the principle that public officials are afforded broad protection when speaking in their governmental roles, even when their statements may be critical or damaging to others. The remaining arguments raised by the parties were either without merit or rendered moot by the court’s ruling.

Apparently, defamation is a Council Member's superpower!

# # #

DECISION

O. v D.

Categories: