1250 Broadway, 27th Floor New York, NY 10001



Within the context of a divorce proceeding, the husband proposed at a court conference that the parties enter into an order agreeing that “’neither party shall contact the other party's employer, colleagues at work, anyone associated with their employment for any purposes whatsoever, and … they shall not disparage, embarrass, or seek to interfere with that party's employment.’” Since it was also her former employer, the wife objected and suggested that the restriction be limited to discussing "’the plaintiff or the matrimonial [action], those issues.’”

After the Westchester County Supreme Court signed a directive which restricted the wife from communicating with the employer "’regarding the Plaintiff … the facts and circumstances of this divorce (in the broadest meaning of the terms), the facts and circumstances of the parties' marriage prior to the filing of this divorce, or the parties' children,’" and also prohibited her from "criticizing, denigrating or disparaging the other on any form of social media,’" the wife sought to vacate that order, as overly broad and unconstitutional, but the assigned justice declined that request.

On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, thought that the part about the couple’s kids was an overstep. It noted that the prohibition about “discussing the children with any employee of the plaintiff's employer,” was “never discussed or negotiated during the court conference,” and “was not necessary to prevent professional reputational harm to the [husband] or financial or emotional harm to the children,” and thus vacated that part of the order.

As for the balance of the underlying prohibitions, the AD2 left them undisturbed, as they were not constitutionally impermissible because they had been “narrowly tailored to the facts of the case.”

They certainly weren’t kidding around there ….

# # #


K. v. K.