SCHUMER: RECENT REPORTS REVEAL DANGEROUS GAPS IN INDIAN POINT WATERFRONT SECURITY – SENATOR URGES DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO CONDUCT TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW OF PLANT’S SECURITY, PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 24/7 MARITIME SECURITY PRESENCE
At Times, the Only Barrier Between Boaters and Indian Point are Warning Buoys – Despite Law Mandating a Maritime Security Zone Near Indian Point, 24-Hour On-Duty Patrols are Currently Not Required
Schumer Asks DHS and U.S. Coast Guard to Lead Review of Indian Point Security, Coordinate with Stakeholders & Relevant Agencies, and Local Law Enforcement – Schumer Says that, Between Multiple Agencies, We Have the Resources to Provide 24-Hour Patrol of Indian Point Waterfront
Schumer: Attacking Nuclear Power Plants from the Water is No Longer Just a Sci-Fi Plot – Need to Review & Ramp Up Indian Point Security to Meet 21st Century Threats
Yesteryday, at Peekskill Landing overlooking Indian Point, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer urged the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to conduct a top-to-bottom review of Indian Point Energy Center’s maritime security, in light of recent reports that suggest Indian Point may be vulnerable to a waterborne attack. Currently, there is no requirement for a 24-hour on-duty patrol boat to be stationed near Indian Point, so at times, only a line of warning buoys stand between boaters and the Indian Point facility. While there are multiple patrol boats that are focused on Indian Point, several potential gaps in security have been revealed by media sources that Schumer says need to be assessed, and then rapidly addressed. Schumer suggested that the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which is under the jurisdiction of the DHS, quarterback the effort to provide 24-hour maritime security plan, subsequent to the review of Indian Point’s current security status. Schumer said that 24-hour security by boat is a reasonable and achievable goal – by drawing on the combined resources of the USCG, New York State, and local law enforcement – and called for federal experts to provide recommendations on the best way to close any gaps in Indian Point’s security.
“Indian Point is a high-value resource, but also a high-value target – we must always be vigilant and gaps in security must be patched up as soon as possible. Waterborne attacks on Indian Point are not out of the question, and I believe our best possible defense against such an attack is around-the-clock patrols along the Indian Point waterfront,” said Schumer. “That’s why I’m asking the Department of Homeland Security do a top-to-bottom review to find the gaps in maritime security and, with the U.S. Coast Guard as the quarterback, marshal the available resources to ensure someone is always at the helm. We can never be too safe when it comes to protecting our nuclear power plants and the millions of people that live in their proximity.”
There is a safety and security zone established by the U.S. Coast Guard for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station (IPNPS) that includes all waters of the Hudson River within a 300-yard radius of the IPNPS pier. Entry or movement into the zone is prohibited unless authorized by the USCG. But, according to recent media and watchdog reports, Indian Point’s waterfront is vulnerable to a sea-borne attack, and making sure that at least one vessel is actively patrolling the security zone is a critical and necessary first step to protecting waters near IPNPS.
The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project completed a report in August 2013, commissioned by the Department of Defense, which finds that an attack on Indian Point could result in serious damage to the plant and large release of radiation. According to the report, “Nuclear power plants that use adjacent bodies of water for the cooling of essential equipment and nuclear fuel are vulnerable to such [waterborne] attacks;” Indian Point meets both qualifications, as it has two very large spent fuel pools stored on site and in open air. Recent media reports also found that the security zone is not always monitored by a patrol boat, and often only warning buoys stand in between Hudson River boaters and the Indian Point facility, whose pier extends into the Hudson River. Schumer argued that an attack on the nuclear facility by water is a possibility that must be planned for, and said that 24-hour patrol is a necessary first step in enforcing the USCG safety and security zone.
In order to assess the extent of the security gaps and find the best way forward, Schumer is asking the Dept. of Homeland Security to conduct a top-to-bottom review of Indian Point’s maritime security systems and provide concrete recommendations to address maritime security. Schumer asked all the stakeholders – the NRC, Entergy, the U.S. Dept. of Energy, and local and state law enforcement – to take part in the maritime security review and recommendation process. Specifically, Schumer pointed to a bevy of local resources on or near the Hudson that could be used in concert to provide for 24-hour coverage, including those of the USCG, the New York State Naval Militia, and state and local law enforcement. For example, the USCG has patrol boats along the Hudson, the New York State Naval Militia
Schumer, in addition to this push, has been a long-time advocate of increased security measures at Indian Point, because over 20 million people live within 50 miles of Indian point, approximately 30 miles north of New York City. Between 2005-2007, after reports of faulty warning siren systems and issues with the core water coolant system, Schumer requested independent security reviews.
A copy of Schumer’s letter appears below:
Dear Admiral Papp:
I write to urge you to develop a comprehensive review of maritime security surrounding the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station (IPNPS) and coordinate with state and local law enforcement to lead a plan to ensure that there is 24 hour security in the security zone that consists of all waters along the Hudson within a 300 yard radius of the plant’s pier. Recent media reports have documented what I consider dangerous gaps in Indian Point’s maritime security, identifying that there is no requirement for a 24-hour on-duty patrol boat to be stationed near Indian Point. As a result, there are moments when only a line of warning buoys stand between boaters and the Indian Point facility. I believe that the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security as well as other relevant stakeholders such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, New York State, local law enforcement, and the Department of Energy, must lead a top down review of maritime security around the plant to determine what improvements can be made to maritime security to better protect the plant from waterborne threats and identify and immediately close any gaps in the plant’s security. By drawing on the combined resources of the USCG, the New York State Naval Militia, and local law enforcement, a coordinated effort to ensure 24-hour security by boat is a reasonable and achievable goal that enforces a statutorily set security zone established to protect a critical nuclear installation that is within 50 miles of over 20 million people.
According to 33 CFR 165.169, there is a safety and security zone established by the U.S. Coast Guard for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station (IPNPS) that includes all waters of the Hudson River within a 300-yard radius of the IPNPS pier in approximate position 41°16′12.4″ N, 073°57′16.2″ W (NAD 83). According to a rulemaking published in the Federal Register by the USCG, “This zone is needed to protect the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station from destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or other causes of a similar nature, that may occur as a result of a marine regatta. This zone will preclude vessel traffic from transiting a portion of the east bank of the Hudson River south of Indian Point, New York. Entry into or movement within this zone is prohibited unless authorized by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port, New York.”
I am concerned that although the importance of enforcing this security zone and the purpose behind its creation are clear, there seem to be gaps in security where there is not some sort of vessel in the security zone 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Entry or movement into the zone is prohibited unless authorized by the USCG, and making sure that at least one vessel is actively patrolling the security zone is a critical and necessary first step to protecting waters near IPNPS. The USCG should lead the outreach to others playing a role in securing the waters near IPNPS, including New York State’s Division of Military and Naval Affairs, which has three patrol boats that form part of its Military Emergency Boat Service ready to respond to threats at Indian Point, and local law enforcement such as Westchester, Rockland, and Orange County. The combined maritime resources of these law enforcement agencies can be coordinated in a way that has a vessel near the IPNPS pier at all times. Over 20 million people live within 50 miles of Indian point, approximately 30 miles north of New York City, and a waterborne attack is something that we must go to great lengths to prevent. We can never be too safe when it comes to protecting our nuclear power plant, especially those so close to major population centers and waterways.
Thank you for all of the work you do in protecting our country and your attention to this critical matter. Should you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to contact me or my staff.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Schumer
U.S. Senator