In Riverbay Corporation v. Houston , Riverbay Corporation -- a cooperative -- sought to evict Henry Houston, on the grounds he hadn't been using his apartment as his "primary residence" and had unlawfully sublet his space.
Riverbay's witnesses claimed to have visited Houston's apartment on a number of occasions, and didn't find him there. (They also testified that a search, using Houston's social security number, elicited a Michigan address.)
Riverbay further claimed that a Judy Brown actually occupied the apartment, that it received maintenance payments from her, and that she appeared in an earlier case -- a nonpayment proceeding -- claiming to be the unit's "owner."
Houston explained his parents lived in Michigan. And while he carried a cell phone with a Michigan area code, and had a Michigan driver's license, Houston swore he hadn't actually resided in that state in over a decade. To evidence his New York apartment's "primary" status, Houston submitted "bank and other financial statements" and a New York driver's license abstract from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles.
He also established that Judy Brown was his son's mother, and that she had appeared in the nonpayment proceeding because he was visiting his family in Michigan. (Due to his financial situation, he also relied on Brown to make the maintenance payments.)
The Bronx County Civil Court was of the view Riverbay failed to prove Houston wasn't occupying his apartment as his primary residence. There mere fact Houston was absent from his apartment -- on five occasions over three months -- didn't suggest he wasn't really living there. Similarly, while Houston may have had a Michigan driver's license and cell phone, that, according to the Civil Court, didn't justify finding that the unit wasn't his principal or primary home.
In addition to handing Houston a victory, the judge was quite critical of the behavior of Riverbay's counsel and one of its witnesses -- a New York City Marshal.
When called to testify, the Marshal reportedly displayed a nervous demeanor and relied heavily on an "unidentified document." Believing the Marshal lacked "an independent recollection of the facts to which he testified," the judge asked to see the paper from which the Marshal read. As it turned out, the document was a letter from Riverbay's counsel, outlining the particulars of the Marshal's testimony.
Outraged, by what the court preceived as potentially criminal and ethically questionable conduct perpetrated during the course of the trial, the judge referred the matter to the appropriate authorities for further investigation.
Try marshalling a defense to that.
To download a copy of the Civil Court's decision, please use this link: Riverbay Corporation v. Houston