In J.G. v. The Board of Education of the Rochester City School District , parents of disabled students attending the Rochester City School District sued claiming there was a failure to provide "free, appropriate public education to special education students in the Rochester City Schools."
A 1981 complaint filed by "J.G." alleged the School District hadn't been evaluating or placing students in educational programs in a timely manner nor involving parents in the process.
In 1983, the parties entered into a Consent Decree, wherein the School District pledged to "improve the way it provided special education services to special needs students." It agreed to improve programs, placement procedures, extra-curricular opportunities for special needs students, to undergo a self-assessment, and to train teachers and staff "to be more aware and responsive to the needs of disabled students."
In 1993, J.G. sought and secured an Enforcement Order compelling the School District to adhere to the Consent Decree. In 1996 -- after J.G. filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the District wasn't in compliance with the 1983 Consent Decree or the 1993 Enforcement Order -- the parties entered into another Consent Decree which set forth "specific numeric goals" such as: "(1) timely recommendation by the Committee on Special Education and Committee on Preschool Special Education; (2) timely placement of students in appropriate programs once evaluations had occurred; (3) parental participation and satisfaction; (4) nondiscrimination and equal access; and (5) inclusion in mainstream curriculum and education in the least restrictive environment." This latter Consent Decree set May 1, 2000 as its termination date "after which the Court would no longer retain jurisdiction over the matter."
In 2001, when Judge Michael Telesca -- a United States District Court Judge of the Western District of New York -- hadn't heard from the parties concerning the School District's compliance with the 1997 Consent Decree, he issued an "Order to Show Cause why this case should not be dismissed with prejudice."
J.G. responded the School District wasn't in substantial compliance with the terms of the 1997 Decree's terms. Of course, the School District disagreed and contended that even though all of the standards hadn't been met, it was unreasonable to expect "statistical perfection" in only three years. It further argued it had expended considerable resources paying J.G.'s attorneys fees and generating "reports and data for review by [J.G.'s] attorneys" which could have been better spent on special needs students, and that the School District had begun development of a "Rochester Plan" -- a self-monitoring program designed to "ensure compliance with all regulations, specifically including regulations involving students with disabilities."
J.G. debunked the "Rochester Plan" as a sham and asked the Court to keep the Consent Decree in place.
Judge Telesca concluded the 1997 Consent Decree had expired on its own terms and the Court no longer retained jurisdiction.
Even though the case had been inactive for a considerable period of time, the Judge noted he wasn't arbitrarily terminating the Consent Decree without passing on the significant improvements the School District had made in its supervision and care of special needs students. Specifically, during the 1999-2000 school year, almost 87% of school-age children and 76% percent of preschool children were evaluated within 30 days of a request. The School District also retained a group known as the Advocacy Center to "conduct parent workshops at which parents of special education students are trained and shown how to actively participate in their child's education."
Not only was the School District's placement rate of students in special education programs over 90%, but the number of special needs students routinely placed in general curriculum classes had dramatically improved. As a result, Judge Telesca concluded that "where a court determines that a party to a consent decree is operating in compliance with the commands of the Constitution, and that it is unlikely that the party would revert to non-compliance, the court may terminate a consent decree."
That was the end of that.
To download a copy of the District Court's decision, please use this link: J.G. v. The Board of Education of the Rochester City School District