Did the Appellate Division, First, Department, condone a religious leader's sexual misconduct in Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead ?
In 1994, Adina Marmelstein met Mordecai Tendler, the founder and spiritual leader of The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, and a man known within the Orthodox Jewish community as a "scholar, educator, and community leader."
Marmelstein alleged that Tendler counseled her regarding her "personal, legal, and financial problems," particularly focused on her goals of marriage and procreation. As part of that "therapy," Tendler supposedly induced Marmelstein to have a sexual relationship with him, lasting from November 2000 until May 2005.
Tendler allegedly advised Marmelstein that she was "closed to the possibility of finding a husband," and that she needed to "permit him to have sexual intercourse with her so that her life will open up and men will come to her." He reportedly was so close to God, that was her "only hope."
Unfortunately, Tendler's "treatments" were unsuccessful, and Marmelstein remained unmarried. Furthermore, she alleged that Tendler warned her against exposing their relationship, threatening to have her "placed in a straitjacket," "put in a penitentiary," and "turn the community against her."
In New York County Supreme Court, Marmelstein asserted four causes of action against Tendler. When the court dismissed only two of them ("fraud" and "negligent infliction of emotional distress"), Tendler appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department, which struck the remaining claims (intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of fiduciary duty).
At common law, a woman could sue for "seduction," defined as "conduct on the part of a man, without the use of force, in wrongfully inducing a woman to surrender to his sexual desires." In 1935, the New York State Legislature abolished "seduction" as a means of recovery. (See section 80-a of the Civil Rights Law.)
According to the AD1, the remaining causes of action warranted dismissal because Marmelstein's allegations, "[d]istilled to its essence," comprised a seduction claim barred by law.
Although he advised her on "personal, legal, and financial" problems, neither a fiduciary nor "professional" relationship was alleged. And, while recent caselaw holds open the possibility of a "cleric-parishioner" fiduciary relationship, Marmelstein did not assert that Tendler served as her religious counselor. (The AD1 speculated that plaintiff intentionally omitted that claim for fear of dismissal on First Amendment grounds.)
Such a shonda, wouldn't you agree?
For a copy of the Appellate Division's decision, please use this link: Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead