The Appellate Division, Third Department, shouted a deafening, "Bah Humbug!" in the case of Yule v. New York Chiropractic College .
The New York Chiropractic College (NYCC) hired Mercy Yule as its clinical coordinator of acupuncture and oriental medicine. Her employment contract, which expired August 31, 2006, contained three pertinent termination provisions.
First, if the position was to be modified or eliminated during the course of her employment, the NYCC was required to give Yule six months' advance notice.
Second, under "normal circumstances," notice of continuation, alteration, or non-renewal needed to issue no later than three months prior to the contract's expiration.
And third, if termination was "for cause," the NYCC was required to provide Yule with a formal dismissal notice.
As a result of unsatisfactory performance, Yule was placed on six months' probation, beginning January 17, 2006. Subsequently, on July 10, 2006, Yule received word that her employment was terminated effective as of the contract's end-date.
While the NYCC offered her a different position as a faculty clinician, Yule refused the new slot and brought a lawsuit to recover six months' salary plus accrued vacation time and benefits.
After the Tompkins County Supreme Court granted NYCC's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case, Yule appealed to the AD3 contending that she had not been given proper notice of the College's request to end her lawsuit
The AD3 disagreed and noted that a court may, by giving appropriate notice to the parties pursuant to CPLR 3211(c), treat a dismissal request as one for summary judgment. [1]
While Yule focused on procedure, such as the fact the College had not yet answered her complaint nor completed discovery, the NYCC's motion was predicated on whether:
the terms of Yule's employment agreement required a termination notice; and
NYCC had been genuinely dissatisfied with Yule's performance.
According to the AD3, since both sides had submitted all of the documentary evidence which supported their respective positions, that set a clear course for summary judgment and justified the case's determination based solely on the papers submitted to the court (without need for a formal evidentiary hearing or trial).
As to the underlying merits, the AD3 reminded that if an employment contract contains a clause obligating the employer to afford an employee notice that the contract will not be renewed, the employer is in breach should that notice not be given.
In this instance, however, since Yule's contract provided that notice would issue under "normal circumstances," the fact that Yule had been placed on probation demonstrated that the circumstances were "abnormal," and thus vitiated the need for a predicate notice.
Finally, since Yule's employment had not been prematurely terminated, none of the other termination provisions had been triggered and NYCC was never in breach.
It seems that, in the end, Yule may be in need of some chiropractic help of her own.
(Does the AD3 know no Mercy?)
For a copy of the Appellate Division's decision, please use this link: Yule v. New York Chiropractic College
[1] A recognized exception to the usual formal notice requirement is found in cases where the parties have submitted their proof and deliberately charted a summary judgment course.