In People v. LeGrand , the Court of Appeals concluded that a trial court erred when it refused to allow expert testimony on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.
The rules of evidence seek to ensure that whatever is presented to a jury is relevant, material, and non-prejudicial. Trial courts generally have a great deal of latitude in applying these rules because they are in the best position to evaluate what is being presented, while an appellate court's review is limited to an examination of a paper record, months or years later. Yet, despite this apparent flexibility, a lower court's rulings on evidentiary matters may still be reversed on appeal if the trial court is perceived as having abused its discretion.
In some cases, it is helpful for the jury to hear from an "expert," or someone with special knowledge or skills "beyond the ken of the average juror." For instance, experts often testify in medical malpractice cases, because the average juror just doesn't know a great deal about medicine or medical procedures.
New York has adopted rules promulgated by a 1923 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia case called Frye v. United States to determine whether expert testimony is admissible. Under Frye , an expert's testimony will be permitted if based on science that is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." When objections arise, judges will typically hold " Frye " hearings to determine the propriety of permitting the testimony.
On June 15, 1991, Joaquin Liriano was stabbed to death in Manhattan. Four witnesses to the stabbing helped police create a composite sketch of the suspect.
In 1993, Nico LeGrand was arrested for an unrelated burglary. The arresting officer believed he looked like the suspect in the 1991 homicide, but couldn't locate any of the four witnesses. The investigation stalled.
In 1998, Mr. LeGrand was again arrested for burglary, and again the police concluded he resembled the likeness which had been sketched of a 1991 homicide suspect. This time, although the police located the four original witnesses (and also found a fifth witness), only one positively identified LeGrand as the 1991 assailant (two other witnesses were ambivalent, while the remaining two were unable to identify the supposed perpetrator).
There was no other physical evidence against the defendant other than that single witness's identification.
During a Frye hearing held before a second homicide trial -- the first ended in a hung jury -- the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony based on research findings "regarding several factors that may influence the perception and memory of a witness and affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications: in particular, the effect of 'weapon focus,' the lack of correlation between witness confidence and accuracy of identification, the effect of post-event information on accuracy and confidence malleability."
The defense hoped that the testimony would lead jurors to doubt the ability of the witness to identify the defendant some seven years after the stabbing.
The trial court refused to allow the expert testimony because the conclusions "were not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community." The jury later found LeGrand guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the decision. Our state's highest court reversed and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals held that three factors on which the expert would have testified -- correlation between confidence and accuracy of identification, the effect of post-event information on accuracy of identification, and confidence malleability -- were indeed "generally accepted by the relevant scientific community" within the meaning of Frye . (The expert would also have testified on "weapon focus" -- the idea that while witnessing a violent crime, witnesses look at the weapon, and not the face of the assailant -- but, the Court of Appeals was not convinced a scientific consensus existed for that part of the testimony, and thus, found that component inadmissible.)
Even though this testimony may pass the Frye test, it could still be deemed inadmissible for other reasons. Even if accepted by the scientific community, evidence must still be relevant, material, and non-prejudicial. A trial court must still use its discretion to determine if any scientifically accepted expert testimony satisfied those remaining obstacles.
In this case, however, our highest appellate court concluded that it was an error to preclude the expert's testimony, since the accuracy of eyewitness testimony was vital to the defendant's case. The expert testimony "plainly ... would have benefited the jury in evaluating the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications."
So much for the all-seeing eye.
