DRIVER’S ACTS WERE NOT WITHIN SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT (NOR WAS FRAUD SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED.)
After a civil lawsuit was commenced against Lyft and its driver, N.S., the ride-hailing service asked to be dismissed from the case, claiming that it was not responsible for damages under either the “respondeat superior” doctrine or under the asserted “fraud” theory.
When the Queens County Supreme Court denied the company’s request, an appeal ensued. And on its review the Appellate Division, Second Department, was of the opinion that the court below had committed an error.
Even after affording the pleadings a “liberal construction,” and accepting all facts, as alleged, as true, the AD2 didn’t think the proffered allegations “fit within any cognizable legal theory.” By way of example, it did not believe N.S.'s alleged sexual misconduct fell within that driver’s “scope of employment.” And that any misbehavior that was alleged to have occurred during the ride was “committed solely for personal motives,” and a “departure from his duties as a Lyft driver.”
The AD2 also concluded that the fraud claim was devoid of the required factual specificity and lacked any “details constituting the wrong.” While the plaintiffs alleged that they relied on the “safety” representations that were made on the company’s website, they failed to identify the precise representations upon which they purportedly relied, and failed to “set forth any facts sufficient to show that any alleged representations on Lyft's website regarding the safety of Lyft rides directly and proximately caused the plaintiffs' alleged damages.” To merely assert that the rider wouldn’t have used the service but for for the safety representations was found “not sufficient.”
Given those deficiencies, the AD2 reversed the underlying determination and granted the company’s dismissal request.
Now how up-Lyfting was that?
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DECISION