St. John countered that he had not received any of the legal papers because Stillman's process server had posted them at an apartment St. John no longer occupied.
Even though St. John presented a lease which demonstrated that he had moved some three weeks prior to the plaintiff's service efforts, the New York County Supreme Court concluded that a default judgment should still issue.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed. The AD1 found that the evidence "overwhelming demonstrated that the initiatory papers were affixed not to the door of St. John's actual dwelling place or usual place of abode, but to a prior residence." Yet, notwithstanding that patent irregularity, the appellate court refused to dismiss the case.
Relying upon other precedent (such as the AD2's decision in Kandov v. Gondal ), and a statute known as the Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL), the AD1 concluded that the failure to notify the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) of his address change "estopped [St. John] from challenging the propriety of service made at the former address."
VTL section 505(5) provides as follows:
Change of address. It shall be the duty of every licensee to notify the commissioner in writing of any change of residence of such licensee within ten days after such change occurs and to make a notation of such change of residence on such license in the place provided by the commissioner.
Where is it written in the VTL (or elsewhere, for that matter) that a licensee's failure to notify DMV of an address change justifies service efforts at that individual's last registered address?
Why does noncompliance with a DMV requirement work to an opponent's favor in a civil lawsuit?
(And if we were to agree that the address on file with the DMV can be presumed to be an individual's place of residence within the state, shouldn't that presumption be rebuttable?)
The weirdness doesn't end there. The AD1 went a step further and achieved a result that was inconsistent with the very precedent cited in its own decision. Interestingly, despite the sufficiency of service, the AD1 opted to vacate St. John's default and permitted him to file an answer some four (4) years after the lawsuit had originally been started.
That part baffled us.
If the plaintiff's service efforts were legally sufficient because of St. John's noncompliance with the VTL, then the default should have remain undisturbed. For as the AD2 noted in Kandov v. Gondal :
In this case, the only excuse proffered by the defendant for his default was that on the date of service he no longer resided at the address where service was made, the very address he continues to list with the DMV. Similarly, he contended that the Supreme Court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because he did not receive service ... As the defendant was estopped from raising a claim of defective service because he failed to apprise the DMV of his current address ..., the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying his motion to vacate. (Emphasis added.)
If the proffered excuse was not acceptable, then what was the court's basis to vacate St. John's default and to allow him to file a late answer?*
Did St. John pull off a miracle?
The AD1's decision suggests so.
For a copy of the Appellate Division's decision, please use this link: Stillman v. City of New York
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*For our other blog posts on this topic, please use this link: Defaults