In Anderson v. Abodeen, Lynis M. Anderson sued his former employer and others alleging that he had been subjected to "intentional infliction of emotional distress" and "sexual harassment" in the workplace because of a supervisor's "malicious" display of certain "nude photos."
The proponent of an "intentional infliction of emotional distress" claim must have been injured or otherwise damaged by exposure to "extreme or outrageous conduct" by someone intending to cause "severe emotional distress." Typically, a high standard must be satisfied. By way of example, the conduct in question must be of such a nature that the "average person" would undergo a "severe mental injury" if the identical circumstances were encountered. Some cases have even suggested that the objectionable behavior must "transcend the bounds of decency tolerated by society."
In order to support a workplace-related sexual harassment claim, one must usually demonstrate that a coworker or supervisor has engaged in unwelcome and inappropriate sexually based behavior, which has rendered the workplace atmosphere intimidating, hostile, or offensive. Generally, the conduct must "alter the conditions of employment," and create an abusive environment. While there is no clear cut litmus test, courts will usually look to the totality of the circumstances and examine such factors as the frequency and severity of the conduct, whether the behavior was physically threatening or humiliating, and, whether it unreasonably interfered with an employee's work performance.
On motion, the New York County Supreme Court dismissed Anderson's case. Since the supervisor's actions were not "sufficiently outrageous," and, because there was no allegation or evidence that the behavior had been motivated by an "animus against men," the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the lower court's determination. While Mr. Anderson may certainly have been subjected to embarrassment and ridicule, the appellate court did not believe the conduct in question rose to a legally actionable level and left the dismissal undisturbed.
Despite the end-result of this case, readers are forewarned that harassment need not always be "sexual" in nature or content, or the product of "sexual animus," in order to be considered unlawful. By way of example, if a disparate impact (or "qualitative and quantitative differences" in treatment) based on gender can be credibly demonstrated, liability may be triggered. [See, e.g., EEOC/Christopher v. National Education Association, 422 F.3d 840 (9th Cir.2005)]. And, in practical terms, dismissal of such claims (prior to a trial) may be extremely difficult to achieve.
For a copy of the Appellate Division's decision in Anderson v. Abodeen, please click on the following link:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006_03987.htm
For a copy of the Ninth Circuit's decision in EEOC/Christopher v. National Education Association, please click on the following link:
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/coa/newopinions.nsf/E340D76D1D4D2F3E882570700053DE5A/$file/0435029.pdf?openelement