TENANT ALLOWED TO CHALLENGE HPD'S DECISION IN HOUSING COURT

Once an administrative agency issues a determination, a party will usually have an opportunity to appeal that decision by way of an internal review process. Once those steps have been exhausted, if one remains dissatisfied with the end result, that outcome may then be challenged by way of a special court case, known as an "Article 78" proceeding. Typically, in landlord-tenant and real-estate related disputes, such lawsuits are filed with the supreme court in the county in which the property is situated. If that administrative appeal is not timely brought, (or if the court challenge is unsuccessful), the agency's determination is accorded considerable deference and will be honored and enforced by the courts.
In Westwood Houses, Inc. v. Hayes, the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) denied Keith Hayes's succession claim to a Mitchell-Lama apartment. Although Mr. Hayes timely filed an Article 78 proceeding, the New York County Supreme Court dismissed his case on the basis that the "Civil Court is the proper forum for the landlord and tenant dispute." (Apparently, the Supreme Court punted.)
When Westwood subsequently commenced its eviction proceeding against Hayes, the Housing Court judge refused to entertain Hayes's succession claim presumptively since the Civil Court is not an appropriate forum within which to review HPD's decision. On appeal, the Appellate Term, First Department, reversed, finding that since Mr. Hayes had been denied a "meaningful review" of his claim, and "the Supreme Court had expressly deferred the succession issue to Civil Court," Hayes was entitled to his day in court and should have been allowed to assert his succession claim as a defense to the landlord's holdover case.
This case raises a number of disturbing questions and concerns. First, it is unresolved whether Mr. Hayes filed an appeal from the Supreme Court's order dismissing his Article 78 proceeding. Clearly, an appeal to the Appellate Division would have been the appropriate procedural course to address the Supreme Court's error. But, if Hayes opted not to do so, he was arguably precluded from seeking further relief in any forum, including the Civil Court.
Since the Civil Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, it lacks the authority to annul or modify administrative determinations. Thus, not only are we are troubled by the Supreme Court's "punt," but we question the attempt to confer power upon a lower court divested of the requisite statutory authority to review (or modify) an agency's decision. The governing statute only confers the power on the "supreme court" to adjudicate Article 78 proceedings.
While the judges of the Appellate Term were clearly attempting to do the "right thing," and fashion a creative remedy to some pretty unfortunate facts and circumstances, we respectfully submit that, this time, they got it wrong. As we have previously observed, "subject matter jurisdiction" can not be capriciously conferred upon a court, not even by an appellate court.
For a copy of the Court's decision in Westwood Houses, Inc. v. Hayes, please click on the following link:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006_50928.htm